The European Monetary System (EMS) was set up in 1979 as a step in the monetary integration of the European Community. At its core, the EMS worked as fixed but adjustable exchange rates and, despite its success in retaining country membership, it experienced a series of currency realignments against the German currency. This paper links the use of realignments to escape clauses in a monetary cooperation agreement and derives hypotheses about who and when is more likely to invoke such clauses. I argue that realignment behaviour is driven by credibility considerations for domestic monetary policy; implications for European trade; the institutional structure of the EMS and its centrality to the larger process of European integration; as well as the behaviors of the core nations -Germany and France. Using monthly data on exchange rate realignments for all EMS member countries from 1979 to 1993, I find strong support for the hypotheses.
Introduction
In addition to the common market, monetary and exchange rate cooperation has been at the forefront of European integration. Currently, the common currency, the euro accounts for close to thirty percent of the stock of global foreign exchange reserves and about forty percent of the daily foreign exchange trading (ECB 2010) . The currency was introduced in 1999 and has become the common money for 17 countries in the European Union. Prior to the euro, the European Monetary System (EMS) and its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) were the most successful attempts at monetary integration in the European Community (EC). 1 The EMS was set up in 1979 and, at its core, it worked as fixed but adjustable exchange rates among the participating countries. While most research regards the EMS as generic fixed exchange rates, the system suffered a series of realignments. The use of realignments was allowed under the EMS rules and they functioned as escape clauses from strict monetary cooperation. This paper first explains why we should understand such escape clauses and does so by linking their extensive use to a decline in the substance of cooperation. Subsequently, the paper uses the political economy of monetary integration to derive empirical hypotheses regarding the likelihood that EMS currencies are realigned against the de facto anchor currency -the German Deutsche Mark. The hypotheses are tested using monthly data on exchange rate realignments for all EMS members from 1979 to 1993.
Analyzing compliance with international treaties is often difficult because required behavior under the agreements that actually get ratified is not very different from what states would have done anyway (Downs et al. 1996) . One issue with endogenous treaties is that country selection accounts partly for the cooperation of signatory nations (von Stein 2005) . However, for some international agreements, including the EMS, the consequence of endogenous negotiations is a balance of substantive goals and flexibility provisions in the treaty itself (e.g. Rosendorff and Milner 2001) . That is, countries sign agreements pledging to curtail their behavior, but allow escape mechanisms that offer relief from treaty clauses while remaining broadly in compliance. In the case of the EMS, the exigencies of exchange rate cooperation without the use of the escape clause of realignment were constraining and costly. The constraints imposed by fixed exchange rates were binding both because European countries were not an optimum currency area that would benefit from a single monetary policy and because capital controls were inefficient and were later abandoned (Frieden 2002 , Eichengreen 2008 . The costs of exchange rate cooperation resulted from the need to adjust domestic economic policy and a loss of external competitiveness.
One way to avoid the constraints of the EMS was to abandon the system. This was not the preferred solution, however, and the EMS has been quite a success in this respect, with countries remaining in the system for more than thirteen years. Rather, countries chose to use the escape clause allowed under the system in order to deflect pressure from exchange rate commitments.
This resulted in a significant number of realignments against the German Deutsche Mark and several currencies lost close to fifty percent of their value while in the EMS. This paper suggests that, for treaties allowing escape clauses, the critical way to gauge the depth of international cooperation is to study the use of such relief clauses.
The origins of the EMS are largely viewed as political rather than economic (Frieden 2002) and its management continued to be a highly political enterprise, as reflected in the rules of the 1978 Brussels European Council Resolution. The Resolution required that exchange rate realignments be treated as a matter of common concern and decided with the agreement of all the countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism. The realignments of the EMS have been studied extensively by economists in the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the deeply argued nature of the ERM realignments, however, such studies fail to consider fundamental questions about political economy constraints and cooperation in international organizations.
Theoretically this paper argues that understanding the calculus of governments realigning their country's exchange rates involves looking at the costs and benefits of such action. Furthermore, I
suggest that taking a comprehensive stock of the benefits and costs of currency realignments in the EMS requires a broad examination of the political economy of monetary integration, incorporating four interconnected approaches: (i) The literature on the credibility of fixed exchange rates (ii) The international relations research studying treaty obligations and compliance; (iiii) The research on the real consequences of monetary integration; and (iv) The domestic politics approach to fixed exchange rates. Following, I hypothesize that the risk of realignment is lower for countries with more left wing representation; when there is more left wing representation at the EMS level; for governments with more pro-European views; and post elections. I also suggest that realignments are less likely when the institutional structure of the EMS is strengthened, and that German economic policy and French politics matter distinctly. The key findings in the empirical section lend robust support to the hypotheses.
The contribution to the literature is twofold. First, the paper extends our understanding of why countries choose to cooperate in the European institutions. A key claim of neoliberal institutionalist theories is that institutions alter state interests, creating incentives for further cooperation (Keohane 1984 , Moravcsik 1998 , Pauly 1992 , Martin 2001 . I find substantial evidence for this position in a core area of European integration: The paper shows that in the case of the EMS, where exchange rate commitments were based on an international treaty, realignments were a matter of joint decision, influenced by the political make-up of EMS level decision makers. It also shows that country membership in the EMS changed the calculus of the European left, by becoming a tool for the left to deliver an acceptable level of price stability. In addition, strengthening the institutional core of the EMS via the Basel-Nyborg Agreement (1987) and increased trade integration significantly affected the pattern of realignments. There are two qualifications to these findings. One is that the escape clause of realignment was used extensively in the EMS, especially in the first years, to the detriment of strict monetary cooperation. The other is that power politics was important: Germany, even if unwittingly, had an asymmetric influence on the economics of the EMS; and the commitment of France to monetary integration diverged from the average, consistent with its status as a key member in the EC.
Second, the paper explains events that make de jure fixed rate arrangements become de facto a variant of a floating regime (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004) . Flexibility via the use of realignments has been important for the longevity of the EMS (Canavan and Rosendorff 1997) . Still, explaining these events is important, because research shows that following through on exchange rate commitments has the greatest influence on inflation and inflation credibility, a key reason for fixing the exchange rate in the first place (Guisinger and Singer 2010, Ghosh et al. 2007 ).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the EMS and country realignment behavior; Section 3 links the use of exchange rate realignments to a decline in the substance of cooperation; Section 4 develops the theoretical argument about the causes of exchange rate realignments and derives testable hypotheses; Section 5 describes the data and methods; Section 6 describes the results of the econometric analysis; Section 7 concludes.
Background: Monetary integration and the European Monetary System
The idea of monetary integration was present already in the Treaty of Rome (1957) , asking member countries to regard their exchange rates as a "matter of common concern" (Article 108). 4 One reason for the EMS being more successful than the "Snake" is that member countries were better at implementing domestic policies necessary to maintain exchange rate commitments. 5 Frieden (2001) , for example, discusses in detail the explanations advanced for why there was more convergence in domestic policies in the 1980s versus the 1970s. The other reason the EMS proved to be so durable was that realignment to countries central parities was a sanctioned way to deflect pressure on the ERM.
In these realignments the weak currencies were devalued and the strong ones were revalued, resulting in the member currencies losing value against the de facto anchor currency -the German Deutsche Mark (DM). The size of the individual devaluations varied from the smallest one of 1%
(Belgian franc, 1987/1) to the largest one of 10.6% (French franc, 1982/6), but their overall size and significance is non-trivial: Over their participation in the ERM, the Italian lira lost 63% against the German currency, the French franc lost 45.2% and the Irish pound 41.4%. Table SI1 in the supplementary information to the paper shows the exchange rate realignment timing for each country in the ERM, for a total of 54 realignments against the German DM.
The origins of the EMS are largely viewed as political rather than economic. Frieden (2002) points out that, in general, Europeans pursued monetary integration despite the fact that labor mobility was low in Europe and countries suffered from asymmetric shocks, i.e. European countries did not form an optimum currency area (see also Eichengreen and Frieden 2001) . More specifically for the case of the EMS, Gros and Thygesen (1998) emphasize the political circumstances and the personal interaction of the leaders of the two core European countriesmargins for exchange rate fluctuations, and, ultimately for abolishing realignments altogether, and was less stringent with regards to budget policy centralization and economic policy convergence.
5 Convergence is not very clear in the first years of the EMS (Frieden 2001) . Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) argue that disinflation in the EMS was part of a global process, rather than the result of system membership. The management of the EMS and in particular the ensuing currency realignments continued to be a highly political enterprise. Specifically, the Resolution required that exchange rate realignments be treated as a matter of common concern, in that "adjustments of central rates will be subject to mutual agreement by a common procedure which will comprise all countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism and the Commission" (Art. 3.2). Because capital controls were still largely prevalent in the EMS countries until the late 1980s, realignments were de facto decided for the most part, and especially when they were comprehensive, in a joint fashion through negotiation, rather than unilaterally under market pressure (Gros and Thygesen 1998, p. 73-79) . Illustratively, the first EMS exchange rate realignment (September 1979) involved only the Danish krone and the German DM, but the negotiations were protracted, signaling the joint nature of the decision. The following two realignments were initiated by the Denmark (November 1979) and Italy (March 1981) , involved only one currency and were substantially less formal in procedure, but still followed the consultation procedure and were operated preemptively to counter competitiveness pressures and higher inflation rates. 6 The undertone was also a desire for more independence from the volatility of the US dollar (Dyson 1994 ) and the inclusion of the Communist Party in the governing coalition in Italy (Gros and Thygesen 1998). Oatley (1997) suggests that Chancellor Schmidt pursued monetary integration to circumvent the conservatism of the Bundesbank.
Cooperation and escape clauses to fixed exchange rates
As shown in the previous section, the EMS was not a seamless fixed exchange rate regime. Rather it experienced a large number of realignments that devalued some currencies significantly over the years. On the other hand, realignments were allowed under the Resolution of the Brussels European Council and the system was successful at keeping its membership. Given this contradiction showing both success and failure, I argue that it is useful to focus on the substance of an exchange rate treaty and analytically distinguish the concept of "strict" cooperation.
The conditions under which states comply with commitments made in international treaties have generated much interest in political science (Simmons 2000 , Von Stein 2005 , Simmons and Hopkins 2005 . Assessing compliance, however, is difficult because treaty provisions are endogenous to the interests of the countries signing them. 7 One consequence of endogenous treaties is that agreements will be flexible by allowing escape clauses from treaty provisions (Abbott and Snidal 2000) . In the political economy literature, the major work on the use of escape clauses has been on the GATT/ WTO (Rosendorff and Milner 2001 , Kucik and Reinhardt 2008 , Pelc 2009 ). However, exchange rate treaties have also included such relief clauses. In the Bretton Woods period, for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) members were asked to maintain fixed exchange rates, but were allowed to realign their exchange rates with IMF's approval.
Below, I argue that we can distinguish analytically between cooperation and "strict" cooperation, by assigning different weights to two core features of international treatiesflexibility and substance. Cooperation occurs when countries stay within the bounds of the treaty, including by taking advantage of specifically sanctioned opt-out mechanisms. Cooperation weighs 7 Von and Simmons and Hopkins (2005) account for the selection of countries into particular treaties. Simmons and Hopkins (2005) show that even if countries select themselves into IMF's Article VIII, signing the treaty both screens and constrains.
flexibility and the ability of treaties to keep their membership relatively more heavily. In their excellent treatment of the topic, Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner (2001) suggest that escape clauses increase cooperation defined in this manner by making the initial agreement on the treaty easier and increasing the overall stability of treaties. In their account, pre-negotiated costs of temporary deviations from a trade treaty insure that escape clauses are used in an optimal fashion.
In addition, defining the circumstances that justify appeals to exception in trade deals can also help moderate the use and time duration of escape clauses (Pelc 2009 ). As shown in the previous section, the EMS has been a quite successful instance of cooperation because until 1992 it has not lost any of its members and many of the realignments were decided in a coordinated fashion.
"Strict" cooperation, on the other hand, weighs more the substance of cooperation and asks both that countries remain within the treaty and that escape clauses be used sparsely in favor of domestic policy adjustments. A focus on this analytical limit makes sense for exchange rate treaties for several reasons: First, exchange rate realignments, unlike trade escape clauses, are not temporary and are not reversed at a later point in time. At the limit, then, their use makes the ERM fully endogenous, i.e. accommodating all inflation in excess of German inflation and de facto lacking credibility because of a failure to constrain (Gros and Thygesen, p. 147). Second, while countries sometimes agreed to domestic reforms in the eve of realignment, this was done in an ad-hoc manner because the EMS involved no pre-negotiated costs to the use of realignments.
As, I show in the next section, countries certainly faced costs when realigning EMS exchange rates, but these costs were not a known and agreed quantity when the treaty was signed. Third, the conditions under which the realignment clause could be invoked were deliberately left unspecified in the Brussels Council Resolution because of speculation fears. Because of these three features, an optimal use of realignments was hard to define and achieve in the EMS. Eloquently, Obsfeld (1991) notes that "while well-designed rules with escape clauses can raise welfare in principle, limited credibility makes it difficult for governments to implement them in practice" (p. 1).
Depending on the degree of capital freedom, exchange rate cooperation implies some loss of monetary policy independence and requires domestic reform. Therefore strict cooperation is costly and rare. The Gold Standard before World War I is one such example, with two features that stand out: First, the system was self enforcing because "there was no question about the authorities commitment" to the gold parity of their currency (Eichengreen 2008 p. 31) . Second, because the system was so credible, capital flows were equilibrating rather than disturbing and countries could violate rules repeatedly in the short run without much consequence. In the EMS, however, governments faced pressure to pursue other goals than exchange rate stability and made extensive use of realignments until 1987. The failure to approach "strict" cooperation presents a problem because it can lead to low credibility of the system and, therefore, explain a related series of disappointing economic outcomes. This includes a slow pace for disinflation stretching economic costs for a long time and costs of disinflation in terms of unemployment not better than for countries outside the EMS (Gros and Thygesen 1998, Fratianni and von Hagen 1992) . 8 In fact, Obsfeld (1991) notes that while the EMS rules and the political costs implied by realignments may lead to an optimal use of the relief clause, it is more likely that the outcome is inferior from a welfare point of view to irrevocably fixing the exchange rates.
Short of never using the relief clause, the practical delineation of "strict" cooperation in exchange rate treaties is not completely clear cut. However, the analytical discussion above has underlined some of the problems involved in invoking the escape clause in exchange rate agreements, including the fact that their use was not necessarily optimal, and has shown the 8 The EMS achieved nominal exchange rate stability (Gros and Thygesen 1998, Oatley 1997) .
importance of studying their determinants. The next section derives theoretical hypotheses about who invokes the escape clause of exchange realignment and under what conditions.
Explaining Realignments in the European Monetary System
The decision to realign an EMS fixed exchange rate entails a government calculation of the benefits and costs of the devaluation against the German DM. The most important benefit of realignment is less real appreciation of the exchange rate, a temporary increase in competitiveness and a (partial) incorporation of higher domestic inflation in the relative price of currencies. That is, adjusting the exchange rate via regular realignments allows policy makers an escape valve in the lack of flexibility presumed under fixed exchange rates and can postpone the need for domestic adjustment of monetary and fiscal policies. Furthermore, while realignments do not necessarily occur because of a domestic currency sell-off, a realignment that follows substantial pressure from foreign exchange markets can have the benefit of stopping the outflow of foreign reserves and the need to maintain high interest rates that harm economic activity. On the other hand, realignments can have substantial costs: For one, large realignments have significant economic costs related to the sudden change in the relative prices of tradable goods, affecting the patterns of intra-EMS trade. In addition, realignments generate political costs associated with back-tracking on a visible policy with distributional consequences, and, specifically, for the case of the EMS there are costs associated with yielding on a policy linked to the more general thrust for integration in the EC.
ERM realignments have been studied previously, but this work ignores political economy considerations, except indirectly via the effect that macroeconomic variables have on the optimizing calculus of governments. 9 I argue that taking a comprehensive stock of the benefits and 9 See e.g., Ozkan (2003) , Siklos and Tarajos (1996) for determinants of ERM realignments; Edin and Vredin (1993) for early work on realignments in the Nordic countries; Chen and Giovannini (1997) for determinants of realignment expectations. Broadly, Simmons (2000) argues that signing international agreements changes countries' incentives to comply because it raises the reputational costs of reneging. Also, Abbott and Snidal (2000) suggest that legalization of international commitments should be especially beneficial for the credibility of "sincerely committed states" (p. 429) like the ones in the EU, because making legal commitments sorts out the countries with a low propensity to defect. Credibility accounts more specific to the set-up of the EMS have also been abundant. Fischer (1987) suggests that the EMS was an "arrangement for France and Italy to purchase a commitment to low inflation by accepting German monetary policy" (Fischer 1987 ). Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) extend this explanation, showing the credibility logic of joining the EMS in more detail: By joining the monetary union, countries face a modified set of incentives vis-à-vis inflation. In particular, while in the ERM, inflation generates real exchange rate appreciation, making inflation a less attractive domestic policy option and therefore, making the ERM a credibility enhancing mechanism. The benefits of having a fixed exchange rate, however, depend on the degree to which policymakers need credibility, or their inflation aversion credentials. Theories predicting partisan differences in macroeconomic policy suggest that right wing parties have a preference for low inflation, and are more likely to tolerate variation in employment in order to reduce inflation (Hibbs 1977 , Alesina et al. 1997 . As a consequence, the left has more incentives to choose fixed rates because it suffers from a relatively larger credibility problem than the right. 11 In the particular case of the EMS, the left could also be expected to prefer a fixed exchange rate because, by the 1980s, EC countries had reached a strong consensus on neo-liberal policies. This consensus emerged from the failed policies of the 1970s, by a process of imitation of Germany's successful policy and by learning from the stark return to orthodox policies by the French socialist government in 1982 -1983 (McNamara 1998 , Woolley 1992 , Dyson 1994 , Oatley 1997 ). In the absence of institutions like the EMS, this consensus was harder to achieve by the left: For example, Boix (2001) and Ross (2001) suggest that in the 1980s both the Spanish and the French Left had lost wage bargaining as a tool to deliver an acceptable level of price stability.
Moreover, the ERM provided the added benefit of joint interventions to defend pegged rates and, more importantly, the political benefit of deferring to a multilateral decision making process.
Before the Basle-Nyborg agreement in 1987, joint intervention to support the system of exchange rate parities was weak, with the Bundesbank being clear that it would not act against its mandate of low domestic inflation. Even if that was the case, however, the joint decision making process as opposed to unilateral pegging, allowed left wing governments more leeway in balancing the 11 See on this point Milesi-Ferretti (1995) . Simmons (2004) shows that more left wing representation leads to higher likelihood of staying in the gold standard; Garrett (1998) shows that globalization constrains the policy options of the left. On the other hand, Oatley (1999) While the EMS aimed to move the whole EC on the integration path, at its origins it was a distinctly Franco-German initiative. For both realist and neoliberal institutionalist scholars of international relations, the nature of cooperation is influenced by the interests and behavior of the most powerful players: Although the EMS was supposed to work as a balanced system with interventions to support the fixed exchange rates from both weak and strong currency countries, its de facto economic anchor was the German currency (Gros and Thygesen 1998, McNamara 1998).
Also, while President Giscard of France was personally involved in the set-up of the EMS, his successor, President Mitterrand was not committed to monetary integration and in the early 1980s
the Socialists had a split view of the EMS (Oatley 1997 Finally, there is substantial evidence from unilateral exchange rate pegging that governments tend to postpone devaluations until after elections (Bloomberg et al. 2005) . For the EMS in particular, the evidence also suggests that realignments are politically costly especially because the EMS was the focal point for exchange rate stability (Bernhard 2002, Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 2002) . For example, William Bernhard (2002) argues that the EMS provided domestic audiences with a yard-stick against which to evaluate economic policy. Because generally EMS country inflation rates have been above inflation in Germany, fixed exchange rates implied a real exchange rate overvaluation and a loss of domestic competitiveness. Exchange rate realignments offered temporary relief for this loss of competitiveness, but at the same were a clear indication that the government had carried out expansionary policies, leading governments to lose some political support. That is, realignments in the proximity of elections are interpreted by voters as a sign of incompetence (Meon 2004) . Also, Bernhard and Leblang (2006) show that unanticipated depreciation of the British pound clearly hurt the popularity of the incumbent government. EMS realignments have been in many cases unanticipated events, so they can be expected to hurt the support for the government. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis (H4): Realignments will be postponed until after elections. Pre-election periods
will see less realignment of exchange rate parities.
Data, methods, research design
The data covers monthly observations for the nine members of the EMS' Exchange Rate with the purpose of quantifying the parties' ideas, policy goals and issue. For the purpose of this analysis, I am interested exclusively in the coding of parties' specific stance on economic policy and partisan differences on economic issues. Suitably, the Manifesto Project codes favorable statements on planned economy and market economy. 14 Parties that are favorable to planned economy include in their manifestos statements supporting the need for government to control prices or wages, for the government to have a plan for the economy and regulate the economy. On the other hand, parties favorable to market economy emphasize in their platform the need for economic orthodoxy (reduce spending and deficits, support a strong currency, the banking sector and the stock market), the superiority of capitalism, private property rights and personal initiative.
For the analysis I code the percentage of votes for left leaning parties in national legislatures. I also code the average for ERM countries (Germany not included) of the percentage of votes for left leaning parties in national legislature and the share of left leaning commissioners in the European Commission. 15 The expectation is that more left wing representation results in a lower realignment risk. Table 1 summarizes the key independent variables and their expected effect.
[ Table 1 The empirical estimations testing the core hypotheses are logit models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are required to control for unobservable factors that may bias the estimates. To account for the temporal relation among observations I also include the length of time between successive realignments and cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998 ).
The alternative estimation of duration models produces substantively similar results. [ Table 2 about here]
Results and discussion
How well do these models explain exchange rate realignments? Table 3 uses Models 3 and 4 in (the models with the highest adjusted R square in Table 2 ) to construct average predicted probabilities for the months when realignments actually take place versus the months when there is no such realignment. Exchange rate events (e.g., realignments, speculative attacks) are notoriously difficult to predict, both because they are rare events and because they involve complex market sentiment and policy maker action. In the EMS sample, only 5% of observations are realignment events, and while some realignments have been operated under market pressure, many have been pre-emptive and aimed to restore competitiveness. As such, a model that would always predict a non-event would do very well. Table 3 shows that the model specifications do quite well. The average predicted probability when a realignment event actually occurs is between 0.26 and 0.30, more than seven times the average predicted probability for non-events.
[ Table 3 about here]
Furthermore, all four models find strong support for hypothesis (H1). As expected, the coefficients of variables proxying left wing representation are negative and statistically significant. Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here] Regression results also generate partial support for Hypothesis (H2). In particular, governments with a more favorable view of European integration were expected to be less likely to realign their exchange rates. The coefficient on this variable is negative as expected, yet it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance across Models 1 to 4. A dummy variable for the governments with the most favorable positions on European issues or the polarization of parties in the government (legislature) on European issues have a similarly negative coefficient that is not robustly statistically significant to the inclusion of French elections and partisanship.
One explanation for this lack of robustness can be found in the explicit sanctioning of the Brussels
Resolution on the use of realignments, so pro-European governments may not feel in all cases that realignments go against further integration. This is consistent with the view espoused by the European Commission, which was careful not to argue that the success of the EMS was be judged by the frequency or realignments (Van Ypersele 1979) . Another explanation is that the variable is not a very good proxy for the linkages that countries are actually able to forge. 20 For example, Dyson (1994) argues that financial transfers and subsidized loans for Ireland and Italy were a part of the negotiations for EMS.
21
As discussed above, the election of the French Socialists in 1981 significantly increased the risk of exchange rate realignment. In addition, Models 3 and 4 show that the risk was higher more generally in the six month period following French parliamentary and presidential elections. The coefficients on the French domestic politics variables are positive as expected and highly statistically significant and the risk of a realignment in the post electoral period in France is about eight times higher than at other times (Table 4) . Also, the dummy variable for the Basle Nyborg agreement is negative and statistically significant, showing a substantially lower risk of realignment in the period when countries decided to strengthen their cooperation in the ERM. That is, after the adoption of the Basle Nyborg agreement, the risk of realignment was about thirty times smaller.
The German DM /US dollar exchange rate and the German discount rate are also found to significantly affect the risk of exchange rate realignment. As expected, a weaker German currency decreases the risk of realignment, while an interest rate increase in Germany generates more realignment. Table 4 shows the predicted probability changes when varying both variables from their levels in January 1987, the date of the last comprehensive EMS realignments, to September 20 See Stasavage and Guillaume (2002) for a test of linkage politics in the African Currency
Unions.
21 Carrubba (2001) shows the relationship between financial transfers and being pro-integration is negative, positing that transfers are not rewards but, rather, compensate for the pain of integration.
1992, the date of UK and Italy exit from the ERM. Over that period, the German currency appreciated against the US dollar by about twenty-two percent, almost doubling the risk of exchange rate realignment. Also, during that time, German discount rate increased by 5.25
percentage points, leading to a realignment risk almost nine times higher. Higher German inflation does not consistently generate a lower risk of exchange rate realignment.
Real factors (hypothesis H3) also get support from the estimations. In particular, higher ratios of manufactured exports to the DM area scaled to GDP significantly reduce realignment risk. This is consistent with the view that a more developed common market increases the benefits of exchange rate stability and the predicted probabilities estimated in Table 4 show large substantive effects. That is, a country with Denmark's trade profile in 1979 is estimated to have twice the risk of a country like Italy which was more integrated in trade with the German currency area. On the other hand, changes in the trade balance to GDP ratios are not consistently related to exchange realignments, and, in fact, in Model 4, the estimated coefficient is statistically significant in the opposite direction to expectations.
Finally, the results in Table 2 also support the idea that realignments are strategically postponed until the period following elections (Hypothesis H4). Across all models the six month period following elections sees an increase in the likelihood of realignment. The risk is almost twice as high for post-electoral periods (Table 4) . As discussed above, the periods following The results in Table 2 are robust across a series of different specification. First, I have included in the models additional variables: the one month lagged value of the trade weighed real effective exchange rate index (Bank for International Settlements); the lagged domestic industrial production (replacing the one year lagged unemployment) and German industrial production; the domestic interest rate and inflation differentials to the German quantities; the six month, rather then 3 month change in international reserves; a dummy variable coding speculative pressure based on Eichengreen et al. (1994) ; the average inflation in the past ten years; a dummy variable for the period before March 1983, when devaluations were far more prevalent. The inclusion of additional/alternative independent variables does not change the substance of the findings, and the added variables generally do not achieve statistical significance. The exceptions are the variable coding speculative pressure (positive and highly statistically significant), the average inflation in the past ten years (negative and highly statistically significant) and the period before March 1983 (positive and highly statistically significant).
Second, Table 5 shows regression results from alternative specifications of Model 4 in Table   2 [ Table 5 about here] Models 2 and 3 limit the time in the sample to two relevant sub-periods: In Model 2 the time in the sample ends January 1987, the date of the last comprehensive EMS realignment before the 1992 crisis. The period after 1987/1 experienced substantially less realignment and, for some countries, policy convergence justified the lack of exchange rate change. For others, however, the last years of the EMS saw much fewer realignments due to excessive rigidity and a perception that realignments were becoming politically too costly (Gros and Thygesen 1998, Canavan and Rosendorff 1997) 
Conclusion
This paper uncovers the patterns of cooperation in the European Monetary System, as revealed by countries' use of realignments in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Realignments are appeals to escape clauses sanctioned by the Brussels European Council Resolution of 1978. As suggested most prominently by Rosendorff and Milner (2001) , the use of such relief clauses has allowed the EMS to de jure continue to exist and keep its membership intact for up to thirteen years.
Undoubtedly nominal cooperation has been important for European integration, by allowing flexibility and the possibility that countries proceeded with integration at the same pace. This is reflected starkly in the debates of the French Socialists in the early 1980s, when they decided to preserve such cooperation by staying in the EMS and the common market while realigning the This analysis extends the research on both international cooperation and the political economy of exchange rates. First, it shows that in the area of monetary integration in Europe, the institutional context has altered the perceived interests of states. This is an important finding countering of the realist concern that narrow national interest are likely to prevail in how states deal with each other in the European Union. Having achieved monetary integration in the euro area, the EU currently faces stark choices regarding future integration of countries' fiscal policies.
The implication from this research is that the integration achieved so far is a strong push factor for further cooperation, but that such cooperation is very likely contingent on a Franco-German unified position. Second, the paper unpacks de jure fixed exchange rates by looking at the determinants of de facto behavior. As shown, states have been members in the EMS for longer than a decade, yet during the period they availed themselves of the escape clause allowed in the original treaty and several currencies lost close to fifty percent of their value. This is important, because the extensive use of realignments very likely damaged the credibility of states commitment to low inflation and monetary integration. Ozkan (2003) . The UK enters the ERM 1990/10, Spain 1989/6, and Portugal 1992/4. There are 41 realignments against the ECU. Based on the bilateral exchange rates, each currency had a central parity against ECU. There is a difference between the number of realignments against the DM and the ECU, because the ECU value was determined as a weighted average of all ERM member currencies and a country could maintain its parity to the ECU despite being devalued against the DM if other currencies were devalued by larger amounts against the DM.
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